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POST 9/11 CIviL RIGHTS: ARE AMERICANS SACRIFICING
FREEDOM FOR SECURITY?
ERWIN CHEMERINSKYt

I'd like to talk this afternoon about how the worst aspects of American history have been repeating themselves. Throughout American history, whenever the United States has faced a threat, especially a foreignbased threat, the response has been repression. In hindsight, however,
we come to realize that we weren't made any safer from the loss of
rights. I would like to begin by very quickly sketching this history, because I think you can only put what's occurred since September 11 th in
any context with this history in mind.
The history can start with the Alien Sedition Act of 1798.' In the
early years of this country, when survival of the republic was still in
doubt, Congress passed a law that made it a federal crime to falsely criticize the government or government officials. The incompetent administration of John Adams used this to prosecute and convict political opponents. People went to prison for speech - the type of speech Jay Leno
and David Letterman use on a nightly basis.
Historians tell us that the country wasn't any safer for these prosecutions and convictions. Thomas Jefferson ran for president in 1800
partly on a platform that the Alien Sedition Act should be repealed, including some of those who were convicted under it. Jefferson did that no court declared the Alien Sedition Act unconstitutional. In New York
Times v. Sullivan a in 1964, the Supreme Court declared the Alien Sedition Act unconstitutional for the first time in recorded history. It's a
wonderful metaphor - we can't hide that people went to prison for this
speech, and it didn't make the country any safer. During the Civil War,
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, even
though the Constitution gives the president no such authority. Later, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan3 declared this unconstitutional.
What's often forgotten is that hundreds, if not thousands, of people
were imprisoned in the Civil War just for their speech - criticizing the
way the North was fighting the war. Civil War historians will tell us that
the imprisonments did nothing to help the North win the Civil War; they
didn't make the country any safer.
f Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School. This speech was originally presented
at a symposium on March 5, 2004.
1. 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2.
3. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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In 1917 and 1918, during World War I, Congress adopted two statutes making criticism of the draft and the war effort illegal. Those of
you who have studied First Amendment law have read Schenck v. United
States.4 In Schenck, a man circulated a leaflet that argued that the military draft was unconstitutional as a form of involuntary servitude. There
wasn't a shred of evidence that his leaflet had the slightest backing.
There wasn't any proof that even a single person failed to report for induction because of Schenck's leaflet. Nonetheless, he was convicted and
sentenced to ten years in prison for circulating that leaflet, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence.
If you've taken First Amendment law, you've also read the case
concerning Eugene Debs, a socialist leader. In a speech to an audience
he said, "you are good for more than cannon fire. There's more that I'd
like to say but I can't for fear of imprisonment. ' 5 For saying that, Debs
was sentenced to ten years in prison. He ran for president while in
prison, and died soon after his release. Again, there's no evidence that
this made the country any safer.
During World War II, 120,000 Japanese-Americans, aliens and citizens, and 70,000 war citizens were uprooted from their life-long homes
and placed in what Franklin Roosevelt called "concentration camps. ,,6
Race alone determined who was free and who was put behind barbed
wire. The invasion of civil rights was enormous. It didn't do anything to
make the country safer. Not one Japanese-American was ever accused,
indicted, or convicted of espionage or any crime implicating national
security.
One more example: during the McCarthy era, many people lost their
jobs, and even their liberty, based on suspicion of being a Communist. It
truly was the age of suspicion. Professor Chen talked of this in terms of
forced patriotism. The reality is that people went to prison simply for
activities protected by the First Amendment.
Such is the case, again, those of you who study the First Amendment, in Dennis v. United States.7 A group of people were prosecuted,
convicted and sentenced for organizing groups to study the works of
Marx, Lenin and Engels. Their crime under the Smith Act of 19408 was
conspiracy to advocate overthrowing the United States government.
They weren't being accused of conspiring to overthrow the government;
they weren't even being convicted of advocating to overthrow the gov4.
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 (1919) ("you need to know that you are fit for
something better than slavery and cannon fodder.").
6.

See WILLIAM RAYMOND MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE

HISTORY OF AMERICA, 1932-1972, at 300 (1974).
7.
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
8.
18 U.S.C. §2385 (2004).
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ernment. Their crime was conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the
government. There was no evidence whatsoever that their speech posed
the slightest threat to national security, however, the Supreme Court upheld their 20-year prison sentences. Chief Justice Red Vincent wrote the
opinion for the Court. He said, "when the evil is so great as to overthrow
the United States government, there doesn't need to be any proof of increase in likelihood." 9 Again, there was no proof; no evidence, that there
was any threat to national security. These individuals didn't pose any
harm to the country, and yet the Court upheld their sentences.
All of these examples should give us great pause before we take
away civil liberties in the name of national security. I am not the absolutist - I do believe that there are times that rights have to be compromised for security; but I believe before we take away liberties, we should
be really certain that it's really going to make us safer.
What I believe has gone on since September 11th are unprecedented
actions by the government to take away civil liberties, and not in ways
that will make us any safer. I want to focus on three examples. The first
is the unprecedented claim of authority to detain individuals without access to the courts. We'll start by talking about the Jose Padillal ° case; it
might be familiar to you. Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago's O'Hare
airport, now almost two years ago. He's an American citizen and his
alleged crime was planning to build and detonate a dirty bomb in the
United States. So as we talk about the Padilla case, it's important to remember that this was an American citizen arrested in the United States
for a crime allegedly planned in the United States.
Even though Padilla was arrested almost two years ago, to this moment no judge has ever issued a warrant for his arrest. No grand jury has
ever indicted him. No jury has ever convicted him. Instead, the Bush
Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department, by labeling him an
enemy combatant, are holding Padilla indefinitely with no access to the
courts.

The Bush Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department are
taking the position that the president has the authority to suspend the
Fourth, the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments. Now, if the framers of the
Constitution wanted to give such authority to the government to suspend
provisions, they would have said so expressly. Article 1, Section 9, for
example, says that Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus in
times of rebellion and insurrection.' The Fifth Amendment says that the
9.
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516-17 ("Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence
created a 'clear and present danger' of an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence.").
10.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
2.
11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
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right to grand jury indictment can be suspended in
stances. 12 But there's no clause anywhere in the Fourth
parts of the Fifth Amendment, or the Sixth Amendment
ministration simply say, "if we designate somebody an
ant, we can hold that person forever."

certain circumAmendment, in
that lets the adenemy combat-

I'm always skeptical of "framers' intent" arguments and it's very
difficult to know what the framers wanted; usually each side can muster
quotes from the framers to support their position. If there's any way the
framers' intent is clear, it's in the distrust of the executive power; that is
why the framers wanted to make sure that before somebody was arrested,
they're generally before a magistrate. That is also why they wanted to
make sure that there would be a grand jury indictment before somebody
was held.
In Padilla's case, he didn't have a grand jury. That is why the framers wanted to make sure that a jury of one's peers had to have proof beyond a reasonable doubt before somebody went to prison. And yet, the
Administration is taking the position that they can suspend all those provisions just by labeling somebody an enemy combatant. This is a stopping point to the Administration's argument. Why couldn't the prior
administration with this philosophy have designated a day in court for
those enemy combatants, and held them without trying them?
Now the argument is made that Padilla allegedly had ties to AlQueda, a foreign power. Does that mean that an administration can take
anybody who is accused in a drug case, say he allegedly has ties to Colombian drug lords and designate that person as a enemy combatant in
the war on drugs? You should know the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in December 2003, ruled against the Bush Administration, saying that he [the president] had no inherent power for the
statutory authority to detain a citizen as an enemy combatant.' 3 The Supreme Court, two weeks ago today, agreed to review the Padilla case and
will issue a decision by the end of June. 14
Another case of interest involved Yassir
citizen who was apprehended in Afghanistan
tanamo. When it was discovered that he was
military prison in South Carolina; he too has
combatant.

Hamdi. He's an American
and then brought to Guana citizen, he was taken to a
been designated an enemy

These situations are identical to John Walker Lindh. John Walker
Lindh is also an American citizen, also apprehended in Afghanistan, and
also brought to Guantanamo, where it was known he was a citizen. The
only difference is that John Walker Lindh was charged with a crime and
12.
13.
14.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 718 (2d Cir. 2003).
Padilla,124 S. Ct. at 2721-22, 2727 (dismissing the case on procedural grounds).
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pled guilty. In the case of Yassir Hamdi, however, the Bush Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department are taking the position that they
can hold him forever as an enemy combatant. I wish the Bush Administration and the Ashcroft Justice Department would explain why they
chose to prosecute John Walker Lindh and why they chose to hold Yassir
Hamdi as an enemy combatant, because the only apparent difference is
that one is Anglo white and the other is of Arab descent. And of course,
it would be very disturbing if that is the reason these two individuals are
being treated differently.
[In Hamdi's case,] the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the government can detain a person indefinitely
as an enemy combatant; there shall be no judicial review. 15 The Supreme
Court however, granted a review 16of the decision; and a decision will be
coming down by the end of June.
One more example: since January of 2002, now about 26 months
ago, over 600 human beings have been held in solitary confinement in
Guantanamo. Until a week ago Tuesday, not one of them was ever
charged with any crime, neither a crime against foreign nations nor a
crime against the United States. There were two individuals who were
told they would be tried in military tribunals. The Administration is taking the position that it can hold these individuals indefinitely as enemy
combatants.
President Bush has said they can be held until the end of the war on
terrorism, which will go beyond any of our lives. What the United States
is doing here is a clear violation of an international law. The Third Geneva Convention requires a hearing in a competent tribunal to determine
whether an individual is a prisoner of war and an enemy combatant.
The international covenants on civil and political rights say that all
individuals held by a government must be given access to the courts.
Even our staunchest allies, nations like Great Britain and Australia, are
condemning what the United States is doing in Guantanamo. The government's position is there can be no judicial review in any court of those
being held in Guantanamo. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia agreed with the Administration. 17 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,' 8 in a case where I was cocounsel, disagreed with the Administration's position, and now the Supreme Court is granting review of the DC Circuit decision to be decided
15.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), rev'g 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va.
2002).
16.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2642, 2650 (2004) (plurality opinion holding that
Hamdi's detention was authorized under the Authorization of Use of Military Force Act passed after
September 1 th, and that even though his detention was authorized by law, Hamdi was still entitled
to due process).
17.

Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

18.

Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003).
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again in June.' 9 The argument is not that those held in Guantanamo have
to have [an] Article III Federal Court [review] their claim, but it is to say
that before a human being is imprisoned indefinitely, there has to be the
opportunity for some review in some tribunal.
Dalia, a previous speaker, talked about many other individuals who
are detained for uncertain, sometimes long, periods of time solely on the
basis of their race. You know, in all of American history, no other president, no other attorney general, has claimed the authority to hold people
as enemy combatants for indefinite periods of time. Even during World
War II, when German saboteurs came into the United States, they were
tried in military tribunals. It was never planned they be held indefinitely
with no trial.
The second example that I wanted to point to is the unprecedented
claims of secrecy asserted by the Bush Administration and the Ashcroft
Justice Department. I have a simple question - and maybe Representative Mitchell will answer it - how many people are now being held by
the federal government or have been held by the federal government
since September 11th as part of the war on terrorism? I predict that no
one in this room can answer that question, because the Administration
refuses to tell us.
Immediately after September 11th, they told us that some categories
of both are detained. In this moment in time, they've never told us how
many individuals have been held, or are now being held, as material witnesses. I debated this issue a year ago against Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff. Now he's a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals in the Third Circuit.20 I asked this question: "It's really simple tell us how many people you have held, or are now holding, as part of the
war on terrorism?" He said, "I can't tell you - that's national security
information." So, I'm really simple sometimes. I asked, "Can you explain to me how it jeopardizes national security to discuss whether it's
50, 500, 5,000, 50,000?" He said, "I just can't tell you that information."
I don't understand why the Administration won't tell us how many
people have been or are now being held. The Center for National Security Studies brought a lawsuit seeking that information. The federal District Court in Washington DC decided that the Freedom of Information
Act requires that the information should be disclosed - the names of
those who are detained as well as the names of their lawyers. The United
States Court of Appeals and the District of Columbia Circuit,2' in a 2-1
decision, reversed explaining that in this time of crisis there has to be
19.
Bush v. Gherebi, 124 S.Ct. 2932 (2004) (remanding case back to the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals to be decided in light of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S.Ct. 2711 (2004)).
20.
In January 2005, President Bush nominated Michael Chertoff to be Secretary of Homeland Security.
21.
Cent. For Nat'l Security Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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great deference given to the administration. In January, the United States
Supreme Court denied review of the case, so we still may not find out
how many people are being held by the federal government.
Those being held as material witnesses are particularly troubling
because the federal material witness statute requires that in order to hold
somebody as a material witness, it has to be shown that they have essential testimony that can't be gained in any other way, without a substantial
risk of life. It's apparent, from what we're learning, that many individuals are being held as material witnesses without meeting these requirements.
In terms of secrecy, there are many other aspects that are very disturbing. One thing that I have had the pleasure to do every spring is
speak at the National Conference of Federal Public Defenders. When I
was in Philadelphia two years ago, a federal public defender from Miami
came and said, "I can't tell you very much about this, there's a gag order,
but what we're seeing now in our federal courts are completely secret
criminal prosecutions." And he says, "These are criminal prosecutions
that appear on no docket sheet, no one is allowed in except for the lawyers; they're covered by a gag order that keeps them from discussing it
with anyone, and then the appeals are held in secret in the Federal Court
of Appeals."
I'm starting to hear about this from other people as well. In fact, the
legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, Steve Shapiro, sent
a letter to the Chief Judge for the Southern District of New York, Judge
[Michael B.] Mukasey, and said "we understand that these are secret
criminal trials." Judge Mukasey responded, and I quote almost verbatim,
"Unfortunately, or should I say fortunately, I cannot answer your question."
In November of 2003, this all came to light when a cert petition was
filed in the United States Supreme Court in one of these cases. It was an
individual whose cert petition alleged that he was tried and convicted in
secret, his appeal was handled in secret and there's no record of it. He
argued that this violated the Constitution. Much of this cert petition was
redacted; that is, it was whited out, but there was still a good deal that
you could read, just by going on Westlaw or the Internet. The United
States filed its opposition to cert entirely under seal, so we can't see any
of it, and the Supreme Court last month denied review of the case. The
idea of totally secret proceedings is very chilling to me. There is no accountability when it is done entirely in secret. To me, totally secret proceedings are reminiscent of the Star Chambers in the middle ages.
Another example of secrecy is a memo that was issued in September 2001 by the [Chief United States] Immigration Judge, Michael J.
Creppy; he called for blanket secrecy immigration pursuits. Now, this
too was total secrecy. It was a situation where no one was allowed ac-
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cess to the person, except for maybe a lawyer. All people present were
covered by a gag order - and there is no mention on any docket sheet. A
challenge was brought by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit in a case called Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, and the
Sixth Circuit ruled that blanket secrecy in these immigration proceedings
violated the First Amendment. In an eloquent opinion, the court talked
about how democracy dies in secret. Blanket secrecy is inimical of the
principles of the First Amendment.
One more example of secrecy involves the fact that the federal government chose to house many detainees in state prisons. It turns out that
many states have laws that forbid secret detentions. The federal government chose to house these detainees in New Jersey state prisons, but
New Jersey has a law prohibiting secret arrests and detentions. Also, the
Freedom of Information Act provides that information is accessible for
anyone being held in a New Jersey prison. A Freedom of Information
Act request was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in New Jersey in order to get the identity of all of those who were being held as
detainees in the New Jersey prisons.2 3 A state trial court for New Jersey
ruled the information could be released under the clear dictates of New
Jersey law.
The federal government then adopted a regulation that said any state
that holds federal detainees is prohibited from disclosing the identity of
the detainees through their state law. The New Jersey Court of Appeals
then said New Jersey law had been pre-empted by federal regulation, so
the information couldn't be disclosed. Again, what's the interest in such
blanket secrecy? As Judge Keith said to the Sixth Circuit, "if there's any
need for secrecy in a particular case, let the government explain it, but
blanket secrecy undermines any checks and balances, any accountability.' 24

The third example that I want to talk about is the unprecedented invasions of the right to privacy, and here I do want to talk about the Patriot Act.25 As you might guess, I have a very different take on it than

22.
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
23.
N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that newspaper consortium did not have a First Amendment right to access to deportation hearings involving
persons suspected of having connections to September l1th. The ruling overturned the District
Court for New Jersey which initially granted the newspaper publisher's motion for preliminary
injunction. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002).
24.
Detroit Free Press,303 F.3d at 683.
The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people's fives, outside the public eye, and behind a
closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors. The First Amendment, through a
free press, protects the people's right to know that their government acts fairly, lawfully,
and accurately in deportation proceedings. When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people.
Id.
25.
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Representative Mitchell. We should talk a little bit about how the law
was adopted, something that hasn't been mentioned here today.
Not long after September l1th, on a Monday, Attorney General
Ashcroft went before the Senate Judiciary Committee and presented a
long laundry list of proposals, almost all of which had been previously
been advanced and rejected by Congress. Many of these provisions were
imposed by the Clinton Administration in 1996 after the Oklahoma City
bombing as part of what came to be called the "Anti-Terrorism Effective
Death Penalty Act" of 1996.26 It was rejected by the Republican Congress as too much of an invasion of privacy.
I think Representative Mitchell conceded this when he said that a lot
of these provisions were law enforcement's desires to get more power
and take advantage of September 11 th. In fact, after Attorney General
Ashcroft spoke to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the representatives of
the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Rifle Association
criticized many of the proposals. It's not that often that the ACLU and
the NRA agree on things.
Two days later, Attorney General Ashcroft went before the House
Judiciary Committee and asked for basically the same list of proposals.
There were secret negotiations between representatives from the Congress and the White House. They were going to produce two versions of
the Patriot Act. The Senate version passed with ninety-eight votes. The
House version passed overwhelmingly. No hearing was held in any
committee of Congress regarding the Patriot Act. I can't think of any
other major piece of legislation that was passed without any hearing.
When Senator Feingold objected on that basis, Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah said, "We're in a crisis, we don't have time to hold hearings." To
me, the idea that we could adopt a law that has provisions that significantly affect us without even holding a hearing is quite disturbing.
Well, Representative Mitchell asked any of us to come up with provisions that we find disturbing, and I think the first thing to do is exactly
that. The definition of terrorism under the Patriot Act has two parts first, there must be a violation of a federal law, and it lists a long number
of federal statutes, and second, the act has to be "an act to intimidate or
coerce the government or civilian populations. ,,27 That's the exact language of the law - "intimidate or coerce the government or civilian
populations." If you think about it, most crimes are about intimidating or
coercing somebody - bank robbery certainly fits under that. Kidnapping
certainly fits under that. In fact, an audience member gave the example
of a protest. If somebody intentionally threw a rock through a window in
a federal building, that would be a terrorist act under the Patriot Act be26.
27.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
Patriot Act § 802.
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cause they've intentionally destroyed federal property - that's one of the
federal crimes that's listed - and they did it as part of a protest to intimidate or coerce the government or civilian populations. It's an enormously broad definition. Representative Mitchell, you and I agree that
the reality is that when giving law enforcement broad powers, they will
use them.
Another example is a boy found in a car in Orange County, California, with a pipe bomb. He wasn't engaging in anything that we call terrorist activity, but the government used all of its powers under the Patriot
Act. You might have read a little more than a month ago that the United
States Attorney in Des Moines, Iowa, subpoenaed Drake University for
records of those who participated in anti-war protests. Thankfully, the
public outcry against this helped the attorney decide to dismiss those
subpoenas.
Representative Mitchell is correct - the RICO Act 28 shows us that
when government has broad powers, it will use them. Well, that's just
one more set of powers that are disturbing. Traditionally, going back not
that long ago in American history, there were two models in terms of
surveillance. One is what the government could do in foreign countries
and the other is what law enforcement could do in the United States.
When the CIA operated in a foreign country it wasn't constrained by the
Constitution, but when law enforcement operated in the United States, it
was constrained by the Constitution. Law enforcement, for example,
says you have to get a warrant, issued by a judge, before there would
ever be electronic eavesdropping. In 1972, in a case called the United
States v. United States District Court,29 the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the contention of President Richard Nixon that he could engage
in warrantless wiretapping for national security in the United States. The
Supreme Court emphasized this distinction between law enforcement in
the United States and what was going on in a foreign country.
In 1978, Congress created a third category, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 30 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
provided that if the purpose of the federal government is gaining information about foreign intelligence, then it can meet a lower standard, not
the probable cause standard or the reasonable suspicion standard. Under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, courts can grant warrants for
wiretapping on much less evidence than usual.
The United States Supreme Court has never considered whether it is
constitutional, but the Ninth Circuit, like several other circuits, say it is
28.
29.
30.
(2000)).

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2003).
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1811
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constitutional because the information would not be used for law enforcement purposes; it would just be used for intelligence purposes.
Indeed, it was often said that the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control
Act 3' that regulates wiretapping under the Fourth Amendment was a high
wall between intelligence and law enforcement. What the Patriot Act
does is obliterate that wall. The Patriot Act says that so long as the purpose is intelligence gathering, even though the real primary purpose is
law enforcement, the government can take advantage of all the additional
powers that it gets under the Patriot Act and under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. In other words, so long as the government can
say, goal "A" is intelligence gathering, but goal "B" is domestic law enforcement, they could not get a warrant based on this lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion. They can take advantage of all the additional powers in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
So now, no longer do we have two or three models. Now, basically,
law enforcement can circumvent the Fourth Amendment, circumvent
statutory restrictions, and go to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court. Studies have shown that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court grants the government's request for warrants in 99.99% of all the
cases; there's basically no check of the government at all.
For example, under the Patriot Act, the government is allowed to
find what email addresses a person writes to or receives from, what websites a person visits by showing that it is relevant to a criminal investigation. That is enough probable cause. Not even a reasonable suspicion it's just relevant to a criminal investigation, and it doesn't have to be a
criminal investigation even of that person.
The defense that is offered, as Representative Mitchell presents it, is
that the government has already had this power to find out what phone
numbers a person dials and receives from, under traps and traces. I
would object to that - and even granting that, there's a real difference
here. A trap or trace tells you the phone number; it doesn't tell you content. Finding out what websites a person is visiting does tell you content.
The reality of it is, you can often learn about a person by finding out
what websites a person is visiting. Think about health information, because people go on the web to learn about medical conditions. Sometimes you find inaccurate things as you stumble on the websites that
we've been to visit; I'm sure we've all had that experience.
Another example of a very disturbing provision of the Patriot Act is
the authority for so-called "roving wiretaps." Representative Mitchell
said it used to be, as long as wiretaps existed, that the government would
have to list the numbers that it wanted to tap. With roving wiretaps, they
31.

18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2004).
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can listen to any phone that the suspect reasonably might use. That
means that for a roving wiretap for Erwin Chemerinsky, they could listen
to all of the phones in the building where I work, all of the phones in the
stores where I shop, all of the phones at my friends' houses that I visit,
and here today, all of the phones in this building.
Last year when I debated an FBI agent, he said, "Yeah, with a roving wiretap we can listen to pay phones that you walk in front of on a
daily basis." The question is do we need to do this to make everything
safer? The threat to our privacy is potentially enormous here. With
enough roving wiretaps, the government could listen to any phone anytime they want. Well, the Attorney General's argument, as Representative Mitchell presented it today, is that terrorists quickly change cell
phones. The problem with that argument is that the police can't listen to
a new cell phone until they know that it exists. By definition, if a terrorist has a new cell phone, the police can't tap it, even under a roving wiretap, until they know that it's there. And once they know that it exists,
they can then just add it to the existing warrant. When I raised this in
debate after debate, the response always was "Well, it takes too long to
add new numbers to existing warrants." But of course, all that calls for is
a more expeditious procedure for adding new numbers to existing warrants; it doesn't justify roving wiretap warrants.
In January 2002, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer went before the California legislature and said they needed roving wiretap authority for the state and local police. I was thrilled when the District
Attorney in Los Angeles County, a Republican, not by any means a liberal, said, "just create a procedure where we can quickly add a new number to an existing warrant." And the California legislature went in that
direction.
Another provision of the Patriot Act is Section 215 that allows a
court to order a subpoena from any records about a person, including
library records, bookstore records, creditor records. One thing that
wasn't mentioned by Representative Mitchell is that under such an order
the institution disclosing to the government cannot reveal to the individual that disclosure was made. So if the government requests my library
records, the library is prohibited by law to tell me. The standard here is
not probable cause; it's not even reasonable suspicion. The standard is
relevant to a criminal investigation.
Here, I profoundly disagree with Representative Mitchell. I think
that people will be cautious in the books that they read, the books they
buy or check out from the library, because they're afraid that the government's going to be monitoring them. Representative Mitchell says,
"We speak even though our speech might be used against us, so why
would that change what we read, if that can be used against us?" Well, I
assume that when I'm having a private conversation that it's not going to
be monitored by anybody else. And in fact, if the government wants to
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monitor my private conversation by wiretapping, they better get a warrant based on probable cause, unless they fit under the new provisions of
the Patriot Act.
But the government is allowed to find out what books I'm reading
just because it's relevant to some criminal investigation. As I mentioned,
a university did a survey of libraries in this country - and concluded that
there were 150 libraries that had their records subpoenaed pursuant to the
provisions of the Patriot Act. I'm skeptical as to how much it helps law
enforcement to know what books a person is reading. But I'm not at all
skeptical that it's going to be the effect of knowing what really is a form
of personal activity.
Another provision of the Patriot Act that is troubling is a clause that
says that the government can detain a non-citizen for seven days if
there's reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is assisting in
terrorist activity. That is not probable cause; that is an arrest for seven
days based on reasonable suspicion. This directly conflicts with Supreme Court precedence in two ways: first, the Supreme Court has never
upheld arrests on less than probable cause. And second, the Supreme
Court has said that a person has to be arraigned within 48 hours; this is
seven days. Another provision of the Patriot Act allows indefinite detentions in certain circumstances, even though the United States Supreme
Court in Zadvydas v. Davis32 said that indefinite detention of nonpolitical aliens isn't permissible.
Another provision of the Patriot Act makes it a federal crime to assist terrorist activity. Well, the provision specifically says "it's a federal
crime to give expert assistance to terrorist activity." Remember how
broad the definition of terrorism is? A Federal District Court in Los Angeles in January declared that it is unconstitutional on the grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness.
The government is taking the position that it doesn't have to prove
that a person knew that it was a terrorist organization to have criminal
liability. The government says that all they have to prove is the person
knowingly gave to the organization, and if the government can prove that
it's a terrorist organization, that's enough for a conviction. So somebody
gave to what they thought was a humanitarian organization, not knowing
the government had designated it as a terrorist organization - that would
be a sufficient basis for a conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has declared that government position unconstitutional, and for obvious reasons.
Again, I think that there are instances where the government needs
additional powers. I have no objection, for instance, to the government
32.

533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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doing more careful screening through the airports, even though there's a
lessening of privacy. But my problem with the provisions of the Patriot
Act is that they don't make us any safer. That's why that at this point,
over 250 cities have adopted resolutions criticizing the Patriot Act. A
week ago yesterday, the Dallas City Council adopted a resolution criticizing the Patriot Act. Now, I don't know a lot about the politics in Dallas - my guess is it's not a particularly liberal body. This is a form of
grassroots activism that you haven't seen in a long time in American
history, and I hope it will have some effect on the worst provisions of the
Patriot Act, which will subsequently expire in December 2005 and, hopefully, not be renewed.
I was not planning on talking about racial profiling, but I wanted to
say a word in response to what Representative Mitchell said. Now, what
he leaves out are the consequences for using race. We can certainly debate whether the screening of somebody's luggage, using race as a reason, is appropriate. I'm very disturbed by that for reasons that I'll explain - I don't think it's effective law enforcement and it's certainly
over- and under-inclusive. It's enormously humiliating to those who are
subjected to it. Individuals were being arrested and detained solely because of race, and that it is truly unconscionable for the government to do
so.
Now as I said a moment ago, one reason I object to racial profiling
is because I think it's terribly ineffective as a law enforcement tool. It is
so under-inclusive and so over-inclusive. It's under-inclusive because
the reality is many can pose as a terrorist who don't fit any profile. For
example, think in terms of McVeigh/Nichols - I remember after the
Oklahoma City bombing one of the first groups people suspected were
middle-Eastern terrorists. Of course, we now know the bombing was by
a militia group in the United States. On the other hand, racial profiling is
horribly over-inclusive. Think of all of the individuals of Arab-Middle
Eastern descent who will be harassed, detained, solely because of race,
and pose no threat whatsoever. Race alone can never be the basis for law
enforcement action; it was George W. Bush, as a candidate in one of the
presidential debates, who said exactly that in the fall of 2000.
I conclude with two quotes from late Supreme Court Justices. One
came from Robert Jackson, who said, "The Constitution is not a suicide
pact. '33 Of course, he's right. If there is a need to lessen liberties, we
need to be sure that it is really going to make us safer.
The other quote came from the late Justice Louis Brandeis. He said,
"The greatest threat to liberty will come from people who claim to be
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is a danger
33.
that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaric logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert
the Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
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acting for beneficial purposes. 34 He said that "people born to freedom
know to resist the tyranny of despots," [and that] "The insidious threat to
liberty will come from well-meaning people with zeal, with little understanding of what the Constitution is about., 35 No, Louis Brandeis never
knew John Ashcroft, but if he had, he couldn't have picked better words
to describe him.

34. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[Eixperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion
of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.
Id.
35.

Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

